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Abstract 
Learning to plan sequences of actions and appropriately adapt 
our actions during interactions with others are both critical 
skills upon which much of human society is built. We know 
that children’s joint action and planning skills are both 
undergoing development during the preschool years, but not 
much is known about how the joint action context influences 
young children’s planning. In this study, we examined the 
effect of playing alone or with a joint partner on sequence 
planning during a problem-solving game in three-year-old 
children. We found that children were better at planning 
ahead in the individual than the joint condition of the game 
despite the joint condition requiring fewer actions on the part 
of the child. In contrast, children were equally good at 
problem-solving (i.e., correcting an error) in both conditions. 
The possible reasons for this difference and directions of 
future research are discussed. 
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Working together with others is important across a variety 
of everyday tasks, ranging from simple, mundane actions to 
considerably complex plans and action sequences. When we 
interact with a partner in a work or athletic setting, the 
complexity of coordinating our actions with another’s is 
quite clear. In contrast, when we perform simple everyday 
actions such as passing a cup of milk to another person, we 
likely do this with ease and do not dwell on the coordination 
with the other or the expectations about the others’ action.   
When acting with another person, planning our own actions 
requires coordinating our actions with another individual, 
whether this coordination is conscious and complex or 
seemingly automatic. Planning our actions when interacting 
with another is a task that spans many domains and is 
critical for much of cognitive and social development. 
Examining the developmental emergence of this skill can 
shed light on how and when the factors necessary to 
working with others are integrated. 
When performing a task by ourselves, we can create a 
plan internally and carry out the task without interruption. 
When jointly acting with another, however, we need to take 
the other person’s actions into account. According to Sebanz 
and Knoblich (2009), intentional coordination of actions 
with another requires representing both one’s own and one’s 
partner’s roles in the task. They suggest that adults engaged 
in joint actions predict a partner’s actions in a joint action 
task by representing the action of a partner and one’s own 
actions in a functionally equivalent way. In fact, 
incorporating a partner’s task “affects one’s own action 
planning and performance even when there is no need to 
take the other’s part into account at all” (p. 357). One 
mechanism thought to underlie the representation and 
prediction of another’s actions is simulation (Gallese & 
Goldman, 1998). That is, when one perceives someone else 
acting in a goal-directed manner, one’s own motor system is 
activated as if one was performing the action oneself 
(Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Simulating a partner’s 
action from a first-person perspective can then be used to 
make predictions about upcoming events (Wilson & 
Knoblich, 2005). Additionally, the motor system is 
preferentially activated for predictions of others’ actions 
within a joint action context (Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 
2010). What is simulated and how perceptual information 
available can be transferred into a motor simulation is still a 
topic of vivid discussion (see for example Uithol et al., 
2011). 
The necessity of incorporating another agent’s actions in 
a similar way to one’s own actions when interacting with a 
joint partner suggests that the ability to represent other 
agents’ actions in a similar way to one’s own would be a 
developmental prerequisite for appropriately planning one’s 
actions within a joint context. One piece of behavioral 
evidence that young children seem to represent others’ 
actions in a similar way to their own actions is that infants’ 
ability to produce particular actions is directly related to 
their perception, prediction, and motor activation when 
viewing others perform the same actions (e.g., Cannon et 
al., 2012; Gerson & Woodward, in press, van Elk et al., 
2008). Meyer and colleagues (2011) found neural evidence 
that this is especially so in joint action contexts. Greater 
activation in the motor system was found in three-year-old 
children watching a joint action partner than when these 
same children watched someone with whom they were not 
collaborating. Further, variation in performance on the joint 
game and in the amount of motor activation observed when 
the child watched the partner act were related, suggesting 
that the child’s motor system activation was likely related to 
the integration of their partner’s and their own actions. 
In addition to a representation of others’ actions, the 
incorporation of others’ actions into one’s own planning is 
critical to acting appropriately in joint contexts. In order to 
address how the presence of others affects planning, 
research must examine differences in planning one’s own 
actions during individual and joint tasks. A recent study 
2380
with adults (Meyer, van der Wel, & Hunnius, 2013) 
measured planning of actions that could be performed alone 
or with another person. It was found that participants 
learned to initiate actions based on predictions about the 
subsequent steps in a task after they gained experience 
acting in the task. This was true in both the individual and 
joint contexts, suggesting that participants were able to use 
their experience to predict their own or a partner’s actions 
and plan their actions accordingly.  
The research reviewed above indicates that motor 
activation during the observation and prediction of others’ 
actions is heightened within joint action contexts and that 
the simulation of others’ actions facilitates motor planning 
in joint contexts. Although motor planning is one important 
aspect of planning sequences of actions, sequence planning 
also requires higher-order processes such as future thinking 
and cognitive control. That is, when performing an initial 
action that propagates a series of embedded actions, one 
must plan not only the motor aspects (such as movement, 
timing, and spatial location) but also consider the 
consequence of these actions on the future steps in the 
sequence. Adults are proficient sequence planners, but 
planning skills are still undergoing development throughout 
early childhood (Carlson, Moses, & Claxton, 2004; 
McCormack & Atance, 2011). Difficulties in planning and 
other higher-order cognitive skills have been linked to the 
relatively prolonged development of the prefrontal cortex 
(see, for example, Welsh, Pennington, & Groisser, 1991). 
Previous research examining the development of 
sequence planning within joint action contexts has largely 
measured children’s planning when engaged in a game with 
a parent or another adult. These studies have found that the 
development of planning with others is a prolonged process, 
in that older children (e.g., between 6 and 11 years) often 
outperformed younger children (e.g., between 3 and 5 years) 
on planning tasks (e.g., de la Ossa & Gauvain, 2001; 
Gauvain, 1992; Gauvain & Rogoff, 1989). This research, 
however, focused largely on the role parents played in 
guiding the joint actions through bids for joint attention, 
scaffolding of the child’s actions, and teaching of strategies 
or rules. Because parents were involved and influencing 
children’s actions during the joint planning games, measures 
of the child’s planning skills were often measured after the 
joint task. The lack of planning measurements during joint 
actions does not take into account whether planning in a 
joint context adds more cognitive demands to a planning 
task. In the current study, we explore the planning skills of 
three-year-old children during a problem-solving task when 
playing alone or with a partner who acts in a predictable, 
uniform manner. 
We created a game in which the child was required to 
plan ahead in order to accurately solve a matching game. If 
he or she did not plan ahead, the child had the chance to 
correct the error during a subsequent step of the game. All 
children played this game both alone and in alternating turns 
with a joint partner, “Kip.” The joint partner was a hand 
puppet introduced during the joint action condition and kip 
always acted predictably so that we could assess the 
influence of a social partner’s presence without the social 
partner’s actions directly influencing any of the child’s 
actions. Kip was introduced as separate from the 
experimenter and the experimenter used a different voice 
when acting as Kip so that the child did not expect Kip to 
scaffold his or her actions. We then examined differences 
between children’s accuracy in planning and problem-
solving during the individual versus joint conditions. If 
simulating a person’s actions in order to motorically plan 
one’s own actions is the key difference between individual 
and joint planning, then children’s performance during the 
joint condition should not be hindered. In fact, because 
children took turns playing with Kip, the joint condition 
required less motor planning than the individual condition; 
children only had to place two balls in the correct buckets 
during each trial instead of four. Therefore, if all planning 
was carried out through the motor system, children’s 
planning should be better in the joint condition than the 
individual condition. If, however, other cognitive processes 
are necessary in order to integrate one’s own plans with 
another person’s actions, plans, and goals, then children 
should perform worse in the joint condition than in the 
individual condition. That is, if the presence of another actor 
increases the cognitive demands of higher-order 
functioning, such as cognitive control, future thinking, and 
sequence planning, children should perform better in the 
individual condition than the joint condition. 
Method 
Participants 
Thirty-two 37-month-olds (mean age = 3 years, 38 days) 
were included in the final data set for this study (15 females, 
17 males). All children were recruited from a database of 
families who volunteered to participate in child studies. An 
additional 10 children participated but were not included 
due to equipment malfunction (n = 2), experimenter error (n 
= 2), not completing all trials (n = 3), or lack of learning of 
the rules of the game or refusal to play with Kip (n = 3). 
Stimuli and Procedure 
Each trial consisted of a set of four balls, four buckets, and a 
clear, plastic tube that held the balls. There were always two 
buckets of one color (e.g., green) and two buckets of another 
color (e.g., yellow). In all but the first training trial, there 
were two balls of one color (e.g., green), one ball of a 
second color (e.g., yellow), and one ball that was 
multicolored (e.g., half green and half yellow). The tube was 
created to dispense the balls one at a time in a particular 
order while still allowing participants to see the colors of the 
upcoming balls (see Figure 1). The multi-colored ball 
always came out of the tube in the second position, and the 
three solid-colored balls were pseudorandomly distributed 
in the first, third, and fourth positions. Except in the 
demonstration trial, different color combinations (consisting 
of red, light blue, dark blue, green, and yellow) were used 
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across trials so as to minimize learning specific rules about 
colors and to keep the children’s attention. In joint play 
trials, the experimenter wore a hand puppet of a chicken 
(called “Kip”). The experimenter used a different voice so 
as to differentiate herself from the puppet. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Example of the game setup. Each trial involved 
three-solid colored balls, a multicolored ball, and two 
buckets in each of two colors.  
 
Training Children were taught how the game worked via a 
set of training trials. First, the experimenter placed a set of 
four solid-colored balls (brown and black) into matching 
buckets. This short phase was to teach children that balls 
had to go into matching buckets. Next, one of the solid balls 
(the one in the second position) was replaced with a multi-
colored ball. When the experimenter extracted the multi-
colored ball, she showed the child that it could go in either 
the brown or the black bucket. After showing them this, she 
always left the ball in the inappropriate bucket in terms of 
meeting the end goal. That is, if there were two brown balls 
in the tube, the multi-colored ball would be placed in a 
brown bucket (and vice-versa if there were two black balls). 
This “mistake” was made in order to show participants the 
importance of considering the upcoming balls in the tube 
and to indicate how errors could be corrected. The 
experimenter then placed a black and brown arrow in front 
of the bucket to indicate which bucket held the multi-
colored ball. After the incorrect placement of the multi-
colored ball, the experimenter would show the child that one 
of the remaining solid-colored balls no longer had an 
appropriate bucket in which to be placed. She would talk to 
the child about how this could possibly be fixed and remind 
them about the meaning of the arrow and hint about a 
possible solution: “Do you remember what this arrow 
means? This means that the multi-colored ball is in this 
bucket. And where can the multi-colored ball go?” She 
would then extract the multi-colored ball and place it in the 
opposite colored bucket. She moved the arrow to the new 
bucket and then placed the solid-colored ball in the 
appropriate bucket. After having done this, she would 
remind the child of how the problem had been solved.   
Two training trials followed this demonstration in which 
the experimenter scaffolded the child throughout the game. 
These two trials consisted of two different sets of colored 
balls, randomly assigned. During these trials, the 
experimenter handed the participant each of the balls and 
asked him or her to place them in the matching bucket. She 
frequently reminded the child that all the balls had to “fit” in 
the buckets (and pointed to the balls in the tube). If the child 
struggled, the experiment gave a series of hints. If the child 
encountered a solid-colored ball that had no matching 
bucket, the experimenter first gave him or her time to try to 
solve the problem themselves. Then she gave the participant 
a series of hints, allowing time for the child to recognize the 
solution between each hint. As in the demonstration trial, 
hints increased in detail, ranging from asking what the 
arrow meant to reminding the child that the multi-colored 
ball could go in either bucket. If the child still did not 
respond to the hints, the experimenter moved the mixed ball 
and demonstrated the solution to the problem. In this way, at 
the end of the training trials, the experimenter always 
ensured that the balls were matched with an appropriate 
bucket at the end of the trial. After these two trials, the 
experimenter told the child he or she was ready to play 
without help. Individual or joint play trials then began 
(counterbalanced between participants). 
 
Individual Play The individual condition consisted of six 
trials. In each of these trials, the child retrieved each ball 
from the tube, one at a time, and placed it into a bucket. The 
experimenter did not participate except to ensure that the 
child did not retrieve the following ball before placing the 
one in his or her hand into a bucket. If the child encountered 
a problem (i.e., a solid-colored ball without a matching 
bucket), the experimenter did not interfere unless the child 
looked to the experimenter for help. When the child 
expressed uncertainty and enquired for help, the 
experimenter would give the same hints as during the 
training trial, again giving the child time to solve the 
problem at each step. After all of the balls were placed in 
buckets, the experimenter asked the child if they were all 
correct (regardless of whether or not they were). If the child 
realized then that there was a problem, the experimenter 
again only helped (as above) if the child enquired. 
 
Joint Play First, a small hand puppet was introduced to the 
child. The child was told the name of the puppet (Kip) and 
that Kip wanted to play with him or her and they could take 
turns (see Figure 2). The joint play session consisted of nine 
trials. In the first, fourth, and seventh trial, Kip let the child 
place the first (and third) ball and Kip placed the 
second/multi-colored (and fourth) ball. Kip always placed 
the multi-colored ball in the bucket that allowed all 
forthcoming balls to be placed correctly. In the other six 
trials, Kip placed the first and third balls and the child 
placed the second and fourth balls. This ensured that the 
number of trials for which the child had to plan (by placing 
the multi-colored ball correctly) was matched across the 
individual and joint conditions. If the child incorrectly 
placed the multi-colored ball and realized this error when 
later attempting to place a solid-colored ball, the 
experimenter followed the same procedure as in the 
individual play trials as far as waiting for the child to 
enquire in order to give any hints. If Kip had to place the 
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solid-colored ball that had no matching bucket, she would 
knock on the full buckets and say “uh oh—this ball can’t go 
in this one” while looking at the empty bucket and would 
ask for the child’s help. If the child did not immediately 
solve the problem, the experimenter followed the same 
pattern for giving hints as in other trials. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: During the joint action condition, children 
alternated taking turns with Kip, the hand puppet. 
 
Coding The focal question in this study concerned 
children’s ability to plan where to place the multi-colored 
ball so that all following balls could fit in matching buckets. 
For each trial in which the child placed the multi-colored 
ball (six individual play and six joint play trials), a trained 
coder judged whether the child placed the multi-colored ball 
in the correct bucket (for the end goal achievement) before 
the following ball was retrieved from the tube. This factor 
will be referred to as planning. The proportion of trials 
within the individual and joint condition for which the 
child’s planning was correct was calculated and used as a 
dependent variable. A second question was whether children 
would correct errors if their initial ball placement was 
incorrect. For this factor (called problem solving), coders 
judged whether the child removed the mixed ball and placed 
it in a correct bucket. If so, the coder noted whether the 
child carried out this action with or without needing the 
assistance of hints from the experimenter. The proportion of 
trials correct after problem solving without hints from the 
experimenter were calculated for each condition (note: this 
gave children credit both for initially correct and correctly 
solved trials without assistance). A second trained coder 
coded 25% of the videos and agreed on 99% of trials. 
Results 
As described above, the variable of interest for planning 
was the proportion of trials for which children were initially 
correct in their placement of the multi-colored ball and the 
variable of interest for problem solving was the proportion 
of trials in which the child had correctly placed all balls 
(without hints) by the end of the trial. Initially, we 
conducted a repeated-measures analysis of variance 
(ANOVA) with Condition (i.e., individual or joint play) and 
Solution Stage (planning vs. problem-solving) as within 
subjects factors. The between-subjects counterbalancing 
factor of Order (i.e., whether the child participated in the 
individual or joint condition first) was also included to 
account for possible learning effects across time. This 
analysis revealed a main effect of Solution Stage (F(1,30) = 
93.33, p < .001, ɳp
2 
= .76), a Solution Stage X Condition 
interaction (F(1,30) = 5.15, p = .031, ɳp
2 
= .15). No other 
main effects or interactions were found (ps > .13, ɳp
2
s < 
.08). The main effect of Solution Stage indicated that the 
proportion of trials that children successfully planned was 
significantly lower than their problem solving performance.  
The interaction suggests that the extent of this difference 
was affected by condition (individual vs. joint). The lack of 
main effect or interactions with Order suggests that children 
who engaged in the joint versus individual task first did not 
differ from one another in their performance. 
In order to follow up on this interaction, we examined 
pairwise comparisons of estimated marginal means. The 
difference between individual and joint conditions was 
significant for planning (md = .11, SE = .048, p = .031; see 
Figure 3) in that children were significantly better at 
planning during the individual than the joint condition. This 
difference between conditions was not present for problem-
solving (md = .001, SE = .035, p = .98). That is, children 
were equally able to solve the problem in both conditions. 
Additionally, children performed significantly better during 
problem-solving than planning within both individual and 
joint conditions (ps < .001). 
In order to examine planning and problem-solving 
performance relative to chance levels (50% of trials correct), 
we conducted one-sample t-tests. In the individual 
condition, children were better at planning than would be 
expected by chance (M = .61, SE = .028, t(31) = 3.95, p < 
.001, Cohen’s d = 1.42). Children were not above chance 
levels of planning in the joint condition (M = .50, SE = .037, 
t(31) = .034, p = .97, Cohen’s d = .012). When children had 
the opportunity to correct their errors (i.e., problem solve), 
they performed at above chance levels in both conditions (ts 
> 12.3, ps < .001). 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Children were significantly better at planning in 
the individual than joint condition (*p = .031), but were 
above chance in problem solving in both conditions. 
Discussion 
Children were significantly better at planning their actions 
appropriately when they played alone than when they took 
turns playing with a social partner. That is, when playing 
2383
alone, they were more likely to take into account the colors 
of the remaining balls when choosing where to place the 
mixed ball. When playing with a partner, children’s initial 
placement of the mixed ball was seemingly random (i.e., the 
placement was correct about half the time [at chance level]). 
Importantly, this was true despite the fact that children had 
fewer actions to carry out during the joint condition. In the 
individual condition, children were responsible for placing 
all four balls correctly. In the joint condition, however, 
children only needed to place two of the four balls. The joint 
partner always played correctly on her trials, so the task of 
placing half the balls should have, in principle, been easier. 
The fact that children did not perform as well in this case 
suggests that something about sharing the task with a 
partner made it more difficult for the children to plan. That 
is, motor planning alone was not sufficient for carrying out 
the task; the demands of sequence planning were made more 
difficult by the presence of another actor. 
In contrast to the difference found in planning, when 
children encountered a proceeding ball for which there was 
no matching bucket, they were equally competent at solving 
this problem regardless of whether they were playing alone 
or with a partner. The fact that children could and did solve 
the problem without hints from the experimenter (or Kip) in 
both conditions suggests that children understood the goal 
of the task and what actions were necessary in order to 
achieve this goal. Thus, it was not a lack of understanding of 
the task that prevented children from planning appropriately 
during the joint condition. This is impressive given the 
complexity of the task carried out by the children. 
Further, children’s planning and problem solving did not 
change as a function of the order in which they played the 
individual and joint conditions. This indicates that children 
did not learn the task over time, regardless of which 
condition they played first. Additionally, the fact that 
children who played the joint condition first did not plan 
more effectively during the individual condition than 
children who played the individual condition first 
suggesting that children were not learning how to plan from 
Kip’s turns placing the mixed ball. Given that Kip always 
placed the mixed ball correctly (on the three trials in which 
she placed this ball), it was possible that children could have 
used their partner’s correct actions to improve their own 
planning, but the lack of order effect suggests this was not 
the case in this study. 
An important question to address in future studies is why 
children were better able to plan during the individual than 
the joint condition. Several possibilities remain to be 
examined, including aspects of attention, inhibition, and the 
social nature of the task.  
One possibility is that attention to the future balls to be 
placed differed when children were playing alone or with 
Kip. If attention does differ, it suggests that the presence of 
a partner made it more difficult for children to concentrate 
on the task at hand and control their attention according to 
the task goal. Baron (1986) has suggested that the presence 
of others causes shifts in cognitive processing. This might 
be particularly true during early development when 
attentional control is still developing. 
Similarly, children may have struggled to maintain 
attentional control because of the timing differences 
between the two task conditions. That is, children could play 
continuously during the individual condition of the task but 
were required to pause their own play while their partner 
acted during the joint condition. It is possible that, it was not 
simply the presence of the other, but the fact that the child’s 
play was interrupted that made planning more difficult. 
Whether the break in play led to disrupted attention control 
or directly to difficulty with planning is unclear, and may be 
driven by other mechanisms such as inhibitory control or 
working memory. Ongoing studies in our laboratory aim to 
address this possibility. 
Finally, the mere presence of a social partner, rather than 
the pauses in play or attention, may have undermined 
children’s planning. Sebanz, Knoblich, and Prinz (2003) 
suggest that the presence of others influences task 
performance, regardless of whether one is acting with the 
other person. They argue, “social facilitation effects are not 
moderated by the specific actions carried out by others” (p. 
12). Instead, they suggest that the presence of another 
improves performance on simple tasks but impairs 
performance on more complex tasks. This possibility would 
be interesting to explore developmentally because of shifts 
in complexity of particular tasks as children gain both 
domain-general and domain-specific skills. 
The current findings shed light on the difficulties 
encountered when first attempting to incorporate predictions 
of a partner’s actions with one’s own planning. It suggests 
that planning for two individuals, even when they share a 
common goal, is more difficult than planning for oneself. 
The relative complexity of the planning task in this study 
may have provided the ideal setting in which to examine 
planning differences across contexts at this age. It is 
possible that, given a less demanding task (or this task at an 
older age), children would have performed similarly in both 
conditions. On the other hand, a more difficult task may 
have created floor effects in which children would not have 
performed at above chance levels in either condition. The 
variability in planning in this study was likely due to an 
interplay between task difficulty and developmental period. 
Whether and how individual versus joint planning differs in 
different developmental periods and at different levels of 
task complexity should be explored further. 
The joint action condition in this study was minimally 
“joint” in that it involved a turn-taking task in which the 
social partner always performed correctly. Turn-taking 
reduced timing and coordination demands common in other 
joint action tasks. Further, if children learned that the joint 
partner always acted correctly, he or she could have simply 
ignored the partner and continued to play without taking 
him or her into account. The fact that children did perform 
differently in individual and joint conditions suggests that 
they likely viewed these conditions differently (but see 
possibility of timing differences above). Future research 
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should consider the differential influences of more or less 
involved interactions with the social partner. 
Findings from the current study suggest differences in 
three-year-old children’s planning, but not problem-solving, 
when they play alone or jointly play with a partner. The 
mechanisms underlying this difference should be addressed 
in future research. Given that children of this age have the 
ability to view a partner as an intentional agent, predict 
another’s actions, and plan their own actions, it seems that 
the integration of these skills is still undergoing 
development. How this differs when playing with parents, 
who may scaffold their actions, or with peers, who are less 
predictable in their actions, is an interesting avenue of future 
work. A better understanding of how planning within joint 
actions develops is important in order to further explore 
educational consequences, underlying neural mechanisms, 
and individuals who show a prolonged or atypical 
developmental pattern. 
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